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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINITFF DID NOT CROSS-APPEAL AND THUS 
CANNOT ARGUE THAT UTAH CODE ANN. 58-50-1 ET 
SEQ. (1987) IS THE OPERATIVE STATUTE CONTROLLING 
THIS LITIGATION 
The Trial Court correctly found that .stute in 
effect when the contract was entered :nto arid the *•• * , -i 
question performed required plaintiff - - 'r 
i- a defendant - unenforceable. 
Plai .r-ii w-i> •.-•• exempt from the . ic^ n- - .: requirement nor 
were h 11< subcontractor - > i • c 
f.he in vi'.mil ot Professional Licensing are not ISSJC-
this case. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THE STATUTE 
IN EFFECT WHEN THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO AND 
THE WORK IN QUESTION WAS PERFORMED REQUIRED 
PLAINTIFF TO BE LICENSED, AND THAT THE CONTRACT 
SUED UPON IS UNENFORCEABLE 
• . i no*- cross-appeal. Cases cited by 
plaintiff arc clearly distinguishable from the facts in this 
case. 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT MOVE TO AMEND PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT BUT PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ONLY AND NOT ON GROUNDS 
OF QUANTUM MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Plaintiff fails to address the fact inac the judgment 
entered was $287.31 more than requested or supported r. •'•••e 
record. There is nothing in the record supporting 
plaintiff's claim that he was unaware that he or his 
subcontractors were required to be licensed. Cases cited by 
plaintiff do not apply. Plaintiff fails to cite any 
authority contrary to the Utah cases cited by defendant 
which hold that unlicensed persons statutorily barred from 
collecting compensation on a contract for work done cannot 
alternatively recover on a theory of quantum meruit or 
unjust enrichment. 
POINT FOUR 
DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE ANY DEFENSES 
Plaintiff is asserting as a defense the protection 
afforded defendant as a member of the general public and of 
the class protected by the contractor licensing laws. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The case cited by plaintiff does not apply. Plaintiff 
fails to cite any authority contrary to that cited by 
defendant requiring the trial court to view the facts and 
circumstances in a light most favorable to defendant in 
defendant's opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT CROSS-APPEAL AND THUS 
CANNOT ARGUE THAT UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 58-50-1 
ET SEQ. (1987) IS THE OPERATIVE STATUTE 
CONTROLLING THIS LITIGATION 
Plaintiff suggests and argues Point One of the Brief of 
Respondent essentially that: 
(a) Under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-50-1 
et seq. (1987) [Contractors Licensing Act] (the "Act") 
plaintiff would not be required to obtain a license as a 
general or specialty contractor and was excepted from the 
licensing requirement because plaintiff was engaged as 
maintenance personnel to perform repairs, having an agreed 
value, including labor and materials, of less than $1,000; 
(b) The . current Utah Division of Professional 
Licensing does not investigate or prosecute violations of 
the Act involving less than $10,000; 
(c) Plaintiff was unaware that the independent 
contractors hired by plaintiff were unlicensed; 
(d) The Division of Professional Licensing looks to 
the 1987 Act regardless of the date of infraction; 
(e) Under the current Act, plaintiff is not required 
to be licensed and therefore can enforce the provisions of 
the contract. 
Plaintiff fails to recognize that plaintiff did not 
cross-appeal the judgment of the Trial Court which 
specifically held that "the statute in effect when the 
contract was entered [into] and the work in question was 
performed required plaintiff to be licensed" (Findings of 
Fact Para. 3), and that the "contract between plaintiff and 
defendant is unforeceable" (Conclusions of Law Para. 1). 
Such Findings and Conclusions are the law of this case. As 
such, plaintiff cannot now urge this court that the 1987 Act 
is the operative statute controlling this litigation. 
Plaintiff suggests that the painting performed at 
defendants1 condomninium complex during March and April, 
1986 represented several individual painting jobs of less 
than $1,000 each, but which totaled $2f202. Plaintiff 
neglects to point out that such painting was performed 
pursuant to a bid submitted to plaintiff dated August 25, 
1985 for1 a price of $2,400 (R. 33), that the painting cost 
to plaintiff was $2,057 and plaintiff charged defendant 
$2,202, that the $2,521 amount sought by plaintiff in his 
action herein represents the balance claimed to be due 
plaintiff under the contract for work performed by plaintiff 
and his subcontractors, and the actual amount for such 
services exceeded $2,521 (See Affidavit of John Holland, 
Para. 9. R. 85). 
There is nothing in the record substantiating or 
supporting plaintiff's claim concerning the current 
enforcement practices of the Division of Professional 
Licensing. However, such current practices are not an issue 
in this litigation since plaintiff's action is based solely 
upon the contract and does not involve enforcement, 
investigative or prosecutorial functions of an 
administrative agency, nor is there anything in the record 
to support plaintiff's claim that plaintiff was unaware that 
the independent contractors hired by plaintiff were 
unlicensed. 
POINT TWO 
PLAIINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THE STATUTE 
IN EFFECT WHEN THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED [INTO] 
AND THE WORK IN QUESTION WAS PERFORMED REQUIRED 
PLAINTIFF TO BE LICENSED, AND THAT THE CONTRACT 
SUED UPON IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
As stated above, plaintiff did not appeal the judgment 
of the Trial Court or its Findings of Fact or Conclusions of 
Law, nor did plaintiff cross-appeal. As such, plaintiff is 
bound by the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law that plaintiff was required to be licensed and the 
contract sued upon is unforceable. 
In Point Two of Brief of Respondent, plaintiff argues 
that the contractor licensing statute must be construed on a 
case by case basis, and cites in support of such argument 
the case of Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States 
Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977). That case is 
clearly distinguishable from the instant case in that in 
Fillmore, the Court considered the following circumstances 
to be of controlling significance: 
In this case it is clear that an unlicensed sub-
contractor is dealing with a licensed general or 
original contractor. And the defendants have not 
disputed that the entire sewer project was under 
the supervision of a licensed project engineer, 
that all of the work had to meet the specificaitions 
and requirements of the general contract and that all 
of the work had to be approved and accepted by the 
project engineer before any payment was made by 
the Town of Ferron. 
561 P.2d 690. 
In the Fillmore case, the project engineer was a 
licensed private engineering firm known as Call Engineering, 
Inc., which did have an inspection responsibility with 
respect to the construction work, the plaintiff was acting 
as a subcontractor under the direct supervision of a 
licensed general or original contractor, and the plaintiff's 
work had to be approved and inspected by the project 
engineer before any payment could be made to plaintiff. The 
Fillmore decision noted that the defendant in that case did 
not fall within the protected class that otherwise had 
adequate forms of protection that compensated for the 
plaintiff's inadvertent failure to renew an expired license. 
No similar facts appear in this case since neither plaintiff 
nor its subcontractors were ever licensed at the time the 
contract was entered into or the work performed (R. 51, 52, 
56). 
Plaintiff next cites in support of his position the 
dissenting opinion in the case of Meridian Corp. v. 
McGlynn Garmacker Co. 567 P.2d 1110 (1977). The majority 
opinion, however, held that even though the plaintiff was 
duly licensed in another state but not licensed as a 
contractor in the state of Utah, the license in such other 
state could not be substituted for the Utah license, and 
thus the plaintiff contractor was precluded from recovering 
on its construction contract in Utah. The decision stated, 
citing prior Utah cases, that it was necessary for a 
plaintiff, where a licensed is required, to allege that he 
had a license in order to state a cause of action. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
This Court has held that the contracts of 
unlicensed contractors are void. In the case 
of Olsen v. Reese we held: 
[C]ontracts made by an unlicensed contractor 
when in violation of a statute passed for the 
protection of the public are held to be void 
and unenforceable. Our statute is so worded 
as to indicate legislative intent to protect 
the citizens from irresponsible contractors. 
* * * 
Plaintiff in this case is aware of our clear 
prior holdings; however, he urges us to over-
rule the case of Olsen v. Reese . . . This 
we refuse to do. 
567 P.2d 110-111 (1977 Utah) 
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POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT MOVE TO AMEND PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT, BUT PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ONLY 
AND NOT ON GROUNDS OF QUANTUM MERUIT OR 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Plaintiff suggests in Points Three and Four of 
Respondent's Brief that the Trial Court correctly granted 
summary judgment to plaintiff on the ground of unjust 
enrichment. Plaintiff fails to address, however, the fact 
that the Trial Court entered judgment for plaintiff in an 
amount of $287.31 more than requested by plaintiff and 
contrary to the evidence that the balance due under the 
contract was $2,521.39 (See Affidavit of John Holland, 
Para. 9. R. 85; Para. 5 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R 81). In support of plaintiff's argument. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Piatt v. Locke 358 P.2d 95 
(1961). That case is clearly distinguishable from facts in 
this case in that plaintiff in Piatt initiated an action 
on a contract seeking the balance due for the construction 
of a swimming pool. The defendant claimed that Piatt was 
not duly licensed as a specialty contractor to construct 
swimming pools, as required by the Contractors Licensing Act 
and Rules and Regulations adopted by the Division of the 
Contractors in effect at that time. Piatt, however, had 
been and was a licensed general contractor when the 
contract was entered into and sued upon and was unaware of 
the specialty classification requiring a specialty license 
to construct a swimming pool. As soon as Piatt received 
notification from the Division of Contractors on May 12, 
1958f he obtained a specialty contractors license for the 
construction of swimming pools on May 13, 1958. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that under those unusual circumstances 
the plaintiff was not barred from recovering under his 
construction contract, and especially since he was otherwise 
licensed as a general contractor. 
Plaintiff argues in Point Three that "it is 
uncontroverted that plaintiff was unaware that there was a 
need for such licensing, if indeed there is such a need, 
either for himself or the independent contractors he 
retained for defendant's behalf. He was further unaware 
that the independent contractors were not so licensed." 
Such statement is totally incorrect in that it is 
controverted that plaintiff was unaware of the licensing 
requirement and there is nothing in the record to support 
such statement by plaintiff as to the knowledge, or lack 
thereof, by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff next relies on the cases of First Security 
Bank of Utah v. Colonel Ford, 597 P.2d 859 (Utah 1979), 
Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 
1977) and Lewis v. Moultree 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981). Yet 
those cases deal with Rules 15 (b) and 5 4 (c) (1) of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This case has not been tried but 
only submitted to the Trial Court essentially on agreed 
facts for its determination of Motions for Summary Judgment 
made by the respective parties herein. Although the Trial 
Court may enter findings or a judgment based on an unpleaded 
issue actually tried by express or implied consent, no 
actual trial of issues has occurred in this case. Plaintiff 
has only moved for Summary Judgment (R. 80-83) on his 
Amended Complaint (R. 14-16) for the amounts claimed due 
under the contract, and at no time has plaintiff moved to 
amend his Complaint. 
Plaintiff fails to cite any authority contrary to the 
cases of Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 600 
P.2d 866, 768 (Utah 1985) and Mosely v. Johnson, 22 Utah 
2d 345, 453 P.2d 149 (1969) which holds that unlicensed 
persons staturorily barred from collecting compensation on a 
contract for work done cannot alternatively recover on a 
theory of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, which cases 
are cited at pages 8 and 9 of the Brief of Appellant. 
POINT FOUR 
DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE ANY DEFENSES 
Plaintiff suggests in Point Five of his Brief that by 
entering into the Management Agreement with plaintiff 
(R. 1-3), the defendant waived its defenses in this 
litigation. In support of such suggestion, plaintiff cites 
Para. 3 (c) of the Management Agreement which provides that 
"the Agent shall not be liable for any error of judgment or 
for any mistake of fact or law or for anything which it may 
do or refrain from doing hereafterf except in cases of 
willful misconduct or gross negligence." Plaintiff fails to 
recognize that defendant is not trying to impose liability 
upon defendant for any particular act or omission, but 
defendant is merely asserting the protection it is afforded 
as a member of the general public by the contractor's 
licensing law duly enacted by the legislature of this state 
for the purpose of protecting defendant and other citizens 
of the class of which defendant is a member. A declared 
purpose of the statute is to require of each applicant for a 
contractors license to "demonstrate a degree of experience 
and general knowledge of the building, safety and health 
laws of the state and of the principles of the contracting 
business reasonably necessary for the safety and protection 
of the public." See Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58A-la-8 (1) (b) 
(1985), Utah Code Ann. 58-50-6 (1) (b) (1987). Sanctions 
apply to contractors who do not obtain required licenses 
including criminal penalties. An unlicensed contractor may 
not utilize the courts of this state for collection of 
compensation without alleging and proving that he was a 
properly licensed contractor when the contract was sued upon 
and the alleged cause of action arose (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
58A-1-26 (1981), Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58A-la-13 (1985), Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 58-50-11 (1987). Criminal penalties are 
imposed for contracting without a license by Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 58A-la-5 (1985)f Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-50-16 (1987). 
There is nothing in the record to support plaintiff's 
claim that defendant in any manner waived any of the 
defenses raised by defendant. Defendant asserts that any 
such waiver by defendant would be contrary to public policy 
and ineffective. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In support of plaintiff's claim in Point Six of the 
Brief of Respondent that the Trial Court cannot grant 
appellant's motion for summary judgmentf plaintiff cites the 
case of Wilkinson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 
of St. Paul of Minnesota, 16 U.2d 204 398 P.2d 207 (1965). 
However that case deals not with motion for summary 
judgment but deals with a motion to dismiss a third party 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted. Plaintiff fails to cite any 
authority contrary to the cases cited by defendant at page 
10 of the Brief of Appellant to the effect that the Trial 
Court failed to view all of the facts and circumstances in a 
light most favorable to defendant in defendant's opposition 
to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the Brief of Appellant, and 
for the reasons stated herein, defendant urges this Court to 
reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and order entry of 
Summary Judgment in favor of defendant. 
Respectfully submitted this £g day of March , 
1989. 
JARREN M. WEGGELAND^ " " 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to Wendy G. Bates, 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent, 4126 South 3055 West, 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 this ^/"~day of March, 1989, 
postage prepaid. 
